TURKEY: Neither WEST nor EAST? by Marin Vrkić
TURKEY: Neither WEST nor EAST?1
Marin Vrkić
Abstract
Following domestic political dynamics, disunity and redirected priorities of the EU 
and decreasing in its NATO geostrategic role, Turkey turned to new policy norm 
where narrowed national interests gained absolute dominance in foreign relations. 
The ensuing quest for flexible alliances with Western rivals has generated more 
transactional and compartmentalized relationships with Western powers as Turkey 
considers its traditional ties with them as unequal and at times unfavorable to its 
interests. From historic low points in relations with US and EU, more often benefits 
Russia as a more powerful partner in ‘marriage of convenience’ with Turkey. Turkey 
in regions as Middle East, Balkan, Caucasus, Central Asia and some part of Africa, 
aims for a larger role and persistently builds its capacity to influence events. The 
ambitious leadership and the transformation of the cooperative and economically 
based Turkish policy to one more exclusive and security-oriented, confronted Turkey 
with a myriad of actors of various scales including global heavyweights.
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The key geostrategic location between three continents positioned Turkey 
as a critical NATO member during the Cold War. The dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, changes in the security environment, fundamental shifts in 
the domestic political scene, and the rise of Islamist political leadership 
have brought discord into the relations with former close partners. In this 
millennium, Turkey started to seek a more independent and active role, 
mainly in its neighborhood, often flirting with its Ottoman legacy.
It was particularly unnerved by NATO’s passivity on its southern flank in 
the initial phase of the Syrian war and subsequent Western powers (mainly 
the US) reliance on Kurdish combatants (PKK’s Syrian franchise) in its 
fight against the rising ISIS. Turkey has a bitter forty-year history of bloody 
conflicts with PKK. Therefore, the prevention of terrorist activities is the 
goal of the utmost importance in the Turkish national security strategy. The 
visible lack of support in crisis after the downing of the Russian military 
plane in November 2015 as well as during and after the failed coup attempt 
in July 2016 have only strengthened the pervasive and enduring sense of 
anxiety and suspicion of the Turkish authorities and a considerable part of 
the general public towards the Western security block.
Moreover, regional and neighborhood situations have become exceptionally 
turbulent where Turkey confronts upheavals and changes that further 
complicating its strategic choices. It deteriorated relations with the most 
powerful Arab states because it supported the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
which is considered a terrorist organization by Egypt, KSA, and the UAE, 
an tried to forge discreet cooperation with Western adversaries such as 
Russia or Iran as they gained control over the end game in the Syrian civil 
war. Having experienced shifted perceptions of threats and ever-growing 
security risks in the southern and eastern flank, Turkey has become more 
assertive, ready to deploy the military outside its borders.
Several domestic factors have also contributed to the militarization of foreign 
policy. Since the executive presidency system took effect in 2018, military 
actions abroad and the embrace of a more nationalist discourse have had 
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strong public support, sustaining the popularity of President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan. Furthermore, the coalition with the ultranationalist party is critical 
for his grip on the power.
The research in this article focuses on the complex web of parties and events 
that are changing Turkey’s internal dynamics, economic, foreign, and 
military policy priorities. It endeavors to present the outlook of Turkey’s 
positioning towards the West and the East. However, the complexity of 
problems between the parties and the speed at which they are changing 
makes it difficult to offer straightforward predictions or recommendations.
Domestic Politics
In 2018, Turkey witnessed fundamental shifts in governance when the nearly 
century-old parliamentary system was altered. With changes of constitution, 
president turned into the head of the executive branch, responsible for the 
conduct of foreign policy as well. The prime minister’s office was abolished 
and the president was allowed to retain leadership of the dominant political 
party. Thus, Erdogan longevity2 was reinforced with a powerful executive 
presidency which has eliminated most checks and balances, stimulating 
formation of an authoritarian system. As the introduction of the presidential 
system was originally the idea of the leadership of ultranationalist party 
(Karaveli, 2018), they have become elections partners setting Turkey on 
nationalistic trajectory, ever since3. As a result, traditional division in Turkish 
identity-based politics, between secularism and nationalism introduced by 
Kemal Pasha Atatürk and political Islam which has been thriving on political 
scene during AKP rule has been sidelined with unique merger of nationalist 
and Islamist visions. It was best manifested on March 2018, when President 
Erdogan saluted attendees at a rally in Mersin with both the ultranationalist 
2  As the head of the Justice and Development party AKP (an acronym for Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi) he has been leading Turkey since 2003.
3  The Nationalist Movement Party MHP (an acronym for Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) has 
been a crucial AKP ally since 2015, when they blocked the attempts of different opposition 
parties to form a coalition government that would have removed the AKP from power.
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“Bozkurt” gesture and the four-fingered with thumb bent “Rabia” gesture, 
aligning himself with the Muslim Brotherhood (RAND, 2020).
Eventually, the nationalistic and autocratic ruling style started to backfire 
both domestically and internationally. The trend of political polarization of 
the country along the ethnic and social lines deepened. An irreconcilable 
division was created between Erdogan’s supporters and his opponents. 
AKP and MHP dominate in the provinces of the conservative, nationalist 
Anatolian heartland, while the secular opposition is reinforcing its base in big 
cities and European Istanbul as well as along the Aegean coast. The support 
for Kurdish biggest party4 has increased in the Kurdish southeast while the 
ruling AKP has lost significant support of moderate and pious Kurds. The 
polarization was best seen in local elections in 2019 when a broad political 
opposition, including the Kurds, for the first time united on the anti-Erdogan 
platform (Rodriguez, 2020). In a bitterly contested pre-election campaign 
the opposition gained important victories in most big cities, including the 
capital Ankara. Even more important was the victory in Istanbul, the largest 
city, where the rallied opposition won twice after AKP on dubious pretense 
contested the first round. Although the results did not directly influence the 
central government, it was a symbolic indication of the falling appeal with 
the urban elite. Moreover, it was widely seen as a rebuke for the apparent 
authoritarianism and a protracted economic crisis.
The longstanding rifts inside the ruling party pushed some of its prominent 
members to try their political luck, further straining Erdogan’s position 
even within his supporter base. The executive presidency was supposed 
to encourage a two-party system. Instead, it facilitated the formation of 
new parties, most remarkably two splinter groups of AKP targeting the 
same populace that brought Erdogan to power. Established by previously 
prominent politicians, they could strengthen the opposition ranks with 
the potential to erode the AKP base. Many of its voters do not acquiesce 
with the state of democracy, a departure from free-market, generally poor 
4  Peoples’ Democratic Party HDP (an acronym for Halkların Demokratik Partisi) – rising 
pro-Kurdish party which embraces progressive organizations and leftist and whose leader is 
facing life sentence. Selahattin Demirtaş has been in jail for almost five years.
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management of the economy, and an inconsistent and flawed foreign policy. 
The country is now divided into two almost equal-sized camps. One camp 
supports Erdogan while the other opposes him. Even a small fraction of the 
votes shifting from AKP to the opposition could become a game-changer 
(Çevik, 2020).
Moreover, despite ideological convergence, a delicate fissure between AKP 
and MHP where one has an Islamic view of Turkey’s identity and goals, 
while the other is ultra-nationalist, makes them often direct competitors 
in interior provinces, where the MHP, rather than the broad spectrum of 
opposition parties, represents an alternative for dissatisfied AKP voters. 
In these circumstances, the common strategy unfolded in playing on the 
Kurdish card and division of the opposition (Tol, 2020). MHP is championing 
a non-flexible view on the Kurdish problem, severely constraining room for 
maneuver on this issue, as a security-driven approach squeezed out options 
for a peaceful and political settlement which tentatively started in 2013 – 
only to be abruptly stopped less than two years later. AKP confronted with 
perpetual failure to develop a comprehensive Kurdish policy at home and 
in the region, recognized the opportunity to use Turkish and Syrian Kurds 
as the ‘enemy’ to win the crucial electoral battles as well as the ongoing 
battle for the hearts and minds of Turkey’s national-religious conservatives, 
including quite some pious Kurds (van Veen and Yuksel, 2018). It resulted 
in a series of military operations outside its borders and domestic repression 
on HDP5, and both are usually condemned from the Western countries. 
Even if conflict with the Kurds has been draining Turkey’s resources for 
decades and continues to curb its strategic potential, there is little prospect 
that Turkey will revive defunct peace talks with the PKK in the foreseeable 
future. Without that, Russia and Iran will ominously portray over realization 
(? The over-realization?) of Turkish national interests.
The internal disputes between Erdogan and the generally intransigent 
MHP leadership and how Erdogan will choose to satisfy the MHP’s 
political aspirations will drive Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkish tentative 




disengagement from the West could be seen through the lens of the growing 
MHP influence in anti-Western moves in Turkish foreign policy. Its future 
ties can depend on whether the MHP leadership prefers to use its political 
leverage to achieve domestic or foreign-policy objectives (Ulgen, 2018). 
Meanwhile, closer ties with Russia are also far from a foregone conclusion, 
given the right-wing nationalists’ distaste for such an alliance. The prospect 
of a protracted economic crisis, where Russia also faces economic problems 
and can be of little help, narrows the options for Turkish leaders, in warming 
up with the West and precarious embrace of China.
Economic Background
In the Erdogan era, the Turkish population generally improved their 
economic status and many people escaped from poverty. Economic 
achievements and strong industrial growth in the AKP’s early years boosted 
the quality of life but also planted the seeds of the frequent and painful cycles 
of recurring economic crunches and financial slumps. The Turkish model 
proved highly dependent on foreign credits and speculative investments, 
vulnerable to a steep decline in foreign direct investment with overall 
weakness toward even minor macroeconomic or political events, like former 
POTUS tweet (Financial Times, 2019). In times when signs of crisis showed 
up and economic growth stalled, government repeatedly opted for increase 
of its spending, and pushed harder for cheap credit that boosts consumption 
(pressuring Central bank to cut its interest rate below inflation rate6, with 
bond purchasing or effectively quantitative easing and reserve management 
policies), largely advancing its structural weaknesses. The set of measures 
directed against foreign investors and more interventionism of state in 
Turkish stock exchange and bond markets in the inevitable case of credit 
downturn regularly lead to escalation of lira conversions into US dollars. 
Lira depreciation, widened current account deficit, increase in external debt 
stock (majority of it is belonging to the private sector in crony construction 
6  In economic circles Erdogan is often recognized as pragmatic autocrat who doesn’t 
understand economy where his unconventional economic thinking – that higher interest rates 
are causing inflation – only serves populistic goals (Bloomberg, 2021).
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companies), growing unemployment are all indicators of vulnerability and 
limited means to face sudden economic shocks with significant repercussions 
on Turkey’s political stability and economic climate. Feeble response and 
equivocal stimulus measures to coronavirus challenge only signaled that 
Turkish government lacked significant monetary and fiscal space given its 
poor handling of economy for sustained period.
After alarming situation in the second half of 2020, Erdogan reluctantly 
consented to reforms, replacing Central bank governor with addition of 
widely unpopular finance minister and his son-in-law after discovery of 
foreign reserves drain of $128 billion and suspicion of huge profiteering in 
their sales (Al Monitor, 2021a). Reforms were promising and recognized 
from the international community, but as problems are structural, painful 
and politically detrimental, so once again Erdogan interfered, trying his 
luck with unorthodox economic policies and loyalists on crucial economic 
position. The circle was closed again with plunge of lira and flight of foreign 
investors (CNBC, 2021). Erdogan nationalistic calls to Turks to help stabilize 
lira by selling their foreign exchange assets and buy lira-based financial 
instruments were doomed to fail and failing to inspire confidence among its 
population and economic actors, has placed Turkey anew in the company 
with the most vulnerable countries in the world.
Overall, Turkey continues to face a contradiction between its economic and 
political interests where AKP officials have tendency to attack the EU and the 
US rhetorically to rally nationalist base. Despite its rhetorical allure, the anti-
Western stance has not translated into a sustainable and prosperous economic 
model for Turkey. In the absence of coherent domestic policy, Western 
engagement and favorable global economic reshuffling resuscitated Turkey 
more than once. The cost of complete alienation from the West would be 
prohibitive for the Turkish economy that is structurally dependent on a free-
market economy and deeply-rooted integration with Western institutions 
(Colakoğlu, 2019). Indeed, the legacy of past generations of Turkish leaders, 
who consciously chose to advance Turkey’s economic integration with the 
West may yet prove the strongest factor keeping the country anchored to the 




Erdogan wants Turkey as an independent geopolitical player who seeks to 
be the dominant regional force, projecting power over neighboring countries 
and across seas. Overestimating its power and capacity, he seeks to compete 
alongside heavyweights, at least in the wider Middle East. In this endeavor, 
Turkey faces some limitations. In terms of its economic capacity, Turkey 
can’t match some of rich regional rivals, while when it comes to generating 
new weapons Turkey had been for long time on the losing side in defense 
technologies with plenty to recoup. 
However, new strategic concept and proactive approach outside its 
borders7, thrusted the military into rapid transformation (side by side with 
post-coup purge), with the goal to improve military capacity and its foreign 
operational capabilities. Frustrated with repeated NATO’s lack of support, 
Turkey quickly started to advance its defense technological and industrial 
base which now can produce various conventional weapon systems (Insight 
Turkey, 2020a).
Four pivots have shaped the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) immense change: 
the naval transformation toward a blue-water navy and the Mavi Vatan8 
concept, the army’s expeditionary warfare concepts and doctrinal order of 
battle, the growing experience of the Turkish special forces and intelligence 
in proxy warfare and a rising forward-basing posture in Turkey’s sphere 
of strategic interests (Insight Turkey, 2020b). The expeditionary posture 
has been gradually gained with forward deployments across region. 
Results can be seen in establishment of more military bases abroad9 where 
Qatar and Somalia bases came in addition to the controversial Bashiqa 
base in northern Iraq to demonstrate the importance of the wider Middle 
7  Except for some of NATO and UN engagements, Turkey’s military and security 
involvement was concentrated predominantly in anti-terrorism activities in fight against 
PKK.
8  Blue Homeland
9  Since 1974 Turkey maintains military presence in unrecognized Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus.
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East region for Turkey security posture. The string of generally successful 
military operations in Northern Syria and subsequent activities in Libya and 
Azerbaijan demonstrated progress in military prowess with most notable 
advance in drone warfare capabilities. Even if Turkey has developed well-
trained and frequently used proxy warfare capabilities as a tool of power 
projection10, experts are of the opinion that for now they have delivered 
modest achievements (Yanarocak and Spyer 2021). Turkish special force 
presence in neighboring Iraq and Syria explains primary security concern, 
the PKK and its offshoots. The country also faces other hybrid risks on 
its territory, including the Salafi extremist terrorist networks of ISIS11 and 
al-Qaeda. Thus, the Turkish military has to ensure a high level of readiness 
to tackle national security threats across a broad spectrum. Finally, 
Turkish military expeditions have consumed huge resources and placing 
an additional burden on the crisis-ridden economy could become urgent 
political question, losing its previous stand of wide support.
As Turkey will continue to depend on foreign military cooperation, it is in 
urge for a well-calculated national capacity analysis to maintain its military 
posture. Despite some success when it comes to high-end and technology-
driven arms, Turkey still needs NATO capabilities and collaboration from 
exactly the same Western countries that Turkey often verbally attacks. 
Even drone industry which assets deployment on various battlefields has 
produced the most of the stir in international media depends on Western 
export licenses and its support and they cannot be taken for granted (CBC, 
2020). However, West is not facing comfortable options as any lack of support 
can easily backfire. It will create opening for Russia or China to once again 
encroach on hungry Turkish weapon market.
10  TAF has developed proxy forces in cooperation with private military contracting 
company SADAT and the Syrian National Army.





Turkey bolsters its own vision of changing global order. While the US as the 
dominant Western power views a Great power competition as flashpoint in 
its strategic priorities, Turkey recognizes, mostly in the rise of China but also 
in Russian revisionism, signs of the US decline. Therefore, Turkey should not 
be only tied to the West but a more independent actor who will advance its 
strategic interests even when those are in contrast with its traditional allies 
or proclaimed core values. These can partly explain closing with Russia but 
also Turkey’s reaction of China treatment of Turkic Uighur population (Al 
Monitor, 2021c). When faced with blatant oppression of its kin minority, 
Turkey compromised on its Islamic prestige in favor of narrow self-interest.
Increasingly faced with clearly opposing interests with the West, Turkey 
considers that it cannot be constrained by firm alliances. Alliances should be 
pragmatic and in accordance with Turkish interests. However, transactional 
and more autonomous approach, limited by inferior economic and military 
capacities is putting Turkey under pressure of bigger powers, namely the 
US and Russia. Hence, even if skillfully leveraging its strategic location, 
Turkey regularly operates with narrowing room for maneuver. Troublesome 
repositioning and strategic constraints were best exposed in Syria where 
principal strategic objective of prevention of Kurdish statelet on its border 
has brought Turkey on brink of military clash with the US and Russia, 
respectively. The potential rekindling of Ukraine crisis could be another test 
for foreign policy course.
Until 2010, Turkey advanced its role through trade and soft power tools and 
had very positive relations with almost all regional powers including Israel, 
Iran and the Arab States. Additionally, the ruling AKP also succeeded to 
advance relations with global powers and all other neighbors — including 
always antagonistic Greece, Armenia, and Syria. The groundwork for that 
approach where Turkey successfully played to the interests and issues of 
key regional players with its mix of trade/investment and politico-religious 
moderation/modernization had been laid by Ahmet Davutoglu and his 
widely known ‘zero problems with neighbors’ narrative (van Veen and 
Yuksel, 2018). However, everything started to change with Arab Spring in 
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2011 when Turkey dropped both Davutoğlu’s and earlier Atatürk’s ‘peace 
at home, peace in the world’ slogans, discovering that its policies failed to 
advance national interests. It led to a weakening of bilateral ties and to an 
erosion of Turkey’s regional influence (Kuo, 2016). Turkey devised that it 
could better benefit from invoking and deploying both coercive diplomacy 
and military force as elements of its engagements with others. Consequently, 
from guarantor of stability and raw model for other countries, Turkey became 
party in all conflicts in the region, time and again with Russia.
Management of Syria and the Kurds are the principal political issues for 
Turkish foreign policy. These two critical issues have direct consequences 
to relationships with the US and Russia, and both have effects on regional 
positions and its reciprocity with domestic developments. With regard to 
wider region of the Middle East, Turkey considers that array of the US allied 
governments and US military engagement in Iraq and Syria are in contrast to 
its national interests. Turkey recognizes US support for the Gulf Arab States 
as the root cause of regional instability. Most of these states deteriorated 
relations with Turkey as they find Turkish proximity to the Muslim 
Brotherhood troubling. Moreover, rapprochement between KSA, the UAE 
and Egypt with Israel under the former US administration pushed Turkey 
toward interest-based cooperation with Iran as both countries see such 
alliance as an existential threat. While Khashoggi case clearly exposed the 
intensity of the struggle for regional supremacy between KSA and Turkey, 
physical proximity, alignment in Syria under the Astana agreement, common 
challenges created by KSA (e.g. Qatar blockade), energy dependence and 
financial crisis all played in favor of closer relations between Iran and Turkey.
Recent decade witnessed how neighboring support in hard days promoted 
mutual trust in Turkish Iranian relations. Turkey helped Iran to break the 
sanctions through equivocal financial and trade relations, while Iran (with 
Russia) was first to support Turkey after failed coup. Most of the others 
showed restraint, raising Turkish suspicion of direct or indirect complicity. 
In times when the balances in the region are in the flux, relations between 
Turkey and Iran are discovering some newfound areas of cooperation. 
After short plunge in the beginning of Syria crisis, clear rule of common 
interests prevailed. Their ability to compartmentalize their bilateral relations 
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has allowed for continued broad cooperation even as they engage in proxy 
war in Syria and competition in Iraq. Even if Turkey is uneasy about some 
of Iran’s activities in its neighborhood, when it places Iran in the broader 
regional context and look at the allied countries opposing it, Turkey considers 
them as more dangerous. However, given their different political regimes, 
conflicting geopolitical ambitions and impact of great powers in the region 
there is a limit to how close they can become. The shifting regional power 
equations are forcing Turkey and Iran to frequently revise their positions, 
which may not always be compatible. That is especially in case when Iranian 
too aggressive stance leads to serious aggravation of regional stability. 
Besides, siding with Iran bears domestic costs as neither Sunni Islamist 
support base nor nationalists are pleased with that.
Concurrently, Turkish relations with Arabs have gravely deteriorated, 
generating serious and often unnecessary chasms (Aoudé, 2020). In the wake 
of Arab Spring the Sunni Middle East has cleaved into two competing axes, 
setting the Turkish-Qatari couple against KSA and the UAE axis aided by 
Egypt after 2013 coup deposition of MB government. To counterbalance 
KSA and the remarkably insistent UAE12, Turkey has created some form of 
unequal strategic alliance with Qatar, where Turkey dominates militarily 
while Qatar provides finance (Cafiero, 2016). Across the region, from Libya, 
Sudan or the Horn of Africa these opposing blocs at present contest each 
other’s influence. In the West, the Islamist based Turkish-Qatari axis is 
often seen adversely as allegedly, they pursue not only legitimate forms 
of cooperation but also joint ventures in illicit finance, support for Islamist 
insurgents abroad, promotion of extremist ideologies, and harboring 
terrorists associated with Hamas and al-Qaeda (Erdemir, and Koduvayur, 
2019). Finally, some analysts believe that Turkish dealings with Iran and 
Qatar and meddling in the Arab regime’s affairs (including championing of 
12  Turkish and Emirati leaders have benefited politically from the confrontation, using it 
to bolster their domestic and international positions. For the UAE, countering Turkey has 
opened the door to new alliances with Western actors, including European countries such as 
France and Greece, and has enhanced its position in Washington. For Ankara, its depiction 
of the UAE as intent on undermining Erdogan has provided fuel for the official narrative 
that outside forces are trying to sabotage a rising Turkey – a key theme in Turkish leaders’ 
explanations of foreign policy objectives to voters (Aydıntaşbaş, 2021a).
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Palestinian cause) have greatly contributed to pushing of the most of these 
regimes toward Israel (Al Monitor, 2021d).
Turkey has learned that opposition to Israel comes at a price. Good 
relationships between Israel, Greece, the Greek part of Cyprus, and Egypt 
made it possible for Turkey’s adversaries in the Eastern Mediterranean to 
benefit from hydrocarbon fields with US blessings. The critical motivation 
behind Turkey’s intervention in Libya is maritime positioning. Out of fear 
of being cut off from key maritime routes should Greece unilaterally extend 
its territorial waters and establish new maritime jurisdiction zones, Erdogan 
has responded by taking a more assertive line nearly pushing two NATO 
countries toward the naval clash (International Crisis Group, 2020). Under 
some pressure from the West, this time mostly from the EU, Turkey reduced 
the tensions, withdrew its ships from the contested area, and even initiated 
some sort of normalization of its relations with Greece. Likewise, the 
realization of limited capabilities, Mediterranean quandaries, and collapse of 
Islamist policy have forced the geopolitically isolated Turkey to improve its 
relations with KSA and Egypt. However, as Turkish problems with all three 
countries are not only political but rather structural, it leaves little room for 
the realization of a pragmatic solution. It is yet to see if Turkey is trying 
to use the normalization of these relations in a subversive way, namely to 
undo the network of cooperation that has emerged between Cyprus, Greece, 
Israel, Egypt, and other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. By 
restoring individual relationships with some of them, Turkey hopes to 
weaken its cohesion and participate in the regional security architectures 
more effectively, i.e. as an agenda-setter (Al Monitor, 2021e).
Neither WEST…
It is obvious that new political realities have set Turkey’s relations with the 
West in a permanent crisis mode. How the subsequent moves will evolve 
remains elusive. This highly relevant and intriguing subject brought about a 
number of analyses which have proposed various scenarios for the future. In 
the wake of the failed coup when the relations reached the bottom, Amanda 
Sloat recognized three possible policy responses for the US and Europe: 
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abandonment, transactionalism, and engagement (Sloat, 2020). They will be 
reviewed in short and refreshed with some up-to-date arguments.
1) Proponents of abandonment recommend a complete breakdown of 
ties, disputing Turkey’s current membership in NATO and its aspiring 
membership in the EU. Regarding the US, they have a score of open issues 
with Turkey. Sheltering of Fethullah Gülen, a self-exiled leader of a Sufi 
Islamic movement that Turkish authorities contend is a terrorist organization 
that masterminded a failed July 2016 military coup d’état; the purchase of 
the S-400; the impending multi-billion fine on Turkish government-owned 
bank accused of orchestrating a large money-laundering scheme designed to 
circumvent sanctions against Iran are only a few of them. Turkish regional 
policies in almost every case are at odds with the US, with a peak in their 
irreconcilable positioning toward the Kurds – the most important question 
in Turkey’s national security and that will certainly continue to complicate 
advancement of US regional initiatives. Steven A. Cook writes, “While 
Turkey remains formally a NATO ally, it is not a partner of the United 
States”, and “Unlike in previous eras, Washington and Ankara no longer 
share overarching threats or interests that bind them together” (Cook, 2018). 
In some more recent commentaries (Forbes, 2020), the sentiment was similar 
only it was addressed to the incoming US administration.
With NATO, the case is corresponding. The recent history with NATO was 
saturated with controversies13, culminating in 2019 when NATO condemned 
Operation peace Spring and Turkey initially refused to back the NATO 
defense plan for the Baltics and Poland (Lipka, 2019) in a bid to extract 
political support for its campaign. The situation only calmed down because 
of Turkey’s quandaries with Russia. Turkey has reacted to geopolitical 
realities and assertiveness and duality of Russian strategy by trying to 
balance relations with its longtime allies and newfound partner. Turkey has 
not given up on the West but appears to hope that its balancing efforts will 
elicit favorable policy changes. Turkey is not turning eastward, as is often 
13  NATO – Turkey crisis is not without precedence. Even before relations have been tense 
like in the Cuban crisis, Cyprus in 1974, or Kurdish problems in the 1990s but this time 
problems are structural and raise the question of why Turkey is in NATO (Gilsinan, 2019).
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speculated, neither towards the Islamic world nor towards Russia – It has 
turned inward (Lindgaard and Pieper, 2020). Rather than joining a regional 
organization as an alternative to NATO, it is more likely that Turkey will 
continue its quest for strategic autonomy where NATO is seen as an additional 
safeguard mechanism. For NATO it means that more often it may have to come 
to terms with a Turkey that is less of an ally and more a self-interested occasional 
partner with its own agenda.
2) That leads us to the second approach, transactionalism, where the West 
accepts that Turkey may not be a reliable ally but still recognizing its strategical 
usefulness. Instead of standing firm on honoring its values, pragmatic and 
practical dealings should be advanced. With a myriad of ostensibly irreconcilable 
issues but in order to keep Turkey in its camp, a logical choice for the West is its 
version of compartmentalization. It suggests Machiavellian policy as the only 
way to counter Russian (Chinese or Iranian?) negative influence.
Therefore, the US reaction to the S-400 was only in a military domain, Turkey 
was removed from the F-35 program but faced no sanctions in trade. Regarding 
the sanctions on Iran, had Turkey not joined them, it would have faced sanctions 
in trade. The bargaining on north Syria is within its own confines as well. Yet, 
it seems that growing crisis between them is becoming chronic, which very 
much pleases Russia. Cases of S-400 and F-35 can be portentous for some of the 
next potential arm deals, where the US refusal to provide sophisticated military 
technologies to Turkey forms a vicious cycle – the greater the crisis between the 
US and Turkey – the closer the relations between Turkey and Russia — which 
in turn means more crises with the US. Overall, Russia and the US dealings 
are critical for Turkey. Interactions with one involve the other as invisible third 
party that conditions, constrains or even shapes their nature and quality.
In relations between Turkey and the EU reciprocity pattern is even more 
evident. Behind them are tumultuous years where relations rather than having 
a basis in any shared values, became purely transactional covering only a few 
areas of mutual interest such as the refugee deal, counterterrorism cooperation 
or the most recently, de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Narrowing 
cooperation is dismissing pretense of accession talks as Turkey is rarely treated as 
a candidate member, simultaneously diminishing Turkey aspirations to become 
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a full EU member. Without structured collaboration, alienation will only grow 
further. Under these circumstances, relationship between the two parties can be 
anything but honest not much different than, for example, the EU-Saudi Arabia 
or the EU-China relationship (Al Monitor, 2021f).
The weakness of the EU position is frequently revealed in its inability to deal with 
Erdogan. While leading an EU candidate-member state for two decades, he has 
gained critical insight regarding European politics. Erdogan, more pragmatic 
than most of the EU leaders (who needlessly made him aware that they need 
him more than he needs the EU), learned how to deal and engage with them. 
Playing on European disunity he found out that humiliating them proved to 
be an effective instrument (WELT, 2021). The inferiority complex has been best 
exposed in the aftermath of the scandal with European Commission President 
Ursula von der Leyen (Politico, 2021). But even before, he found liberty to liken 
Chancellor Merkel and German officials to “Nazis” (Politico, 2017) and challenge 
Macron’s mental health (Euronews, 2020), without consequence, simply playing 
on their rivalry. As a shrewd politician, he uses the leverage of Turkic diaspora 
to maintain active relations with Germany, while France turns out to be a 
natural antagonist inside the EU. The slew of controversies put them regularly 
on different sides, culminating in the last summer Mediterranean incident 
when an escalating war of words threatened to transmit in real life. Turkey and 
France have been locked in various conflicts as Libyan, East Mediterranean and 
sometimes spreading all the way to Sub-Saharan region.
With more crises, Turkish posture and methods are becoming increasingly 
evident; revealing that as the gap between Turkey’s ambitions and 
capabilities is growing, as is the gap between its rhetoric and the realities 
on the ground. Nicholas Danforth best describes Erdogan’s modus operandi 
as “push, pocket any concessions or pause to negotiate if the pushback is 
too strong, and repeat as needed”. It’s a perfect strategy if you prioritize 
short-term concessions and discount the longer-term damage to bilateral 
relationships (Al Monitor, 2021g). In the EU, there is a growing awareness 
that Erdogan usually cannot follow his threats and warnings, exposing them 
as blackmail or bluffing, designed for bargaining purposes and domestic 
gains. Principally, Turkish foreign policy has fallen into the trap of short-
termism and become increasingly unpredictable (Al Monitor, 2020). In 
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these circumstances, the EU gives priority to stability over democracy. An 
unstable autocratic structure presents a great danger for Europe so it seems 
that the new US administration will be the party that insists on human rights, 
exchanging roles with the EU in the good cop, bad cop game. Thus, grand 
bargains are tough to achieve but, eventually, Turkey and the EU will have 
to strike up a working partnership, whereby they cooperate on some issues 
and compete on others (Aydıntaşbaş, 2021b).
Possible venues for Western cooperation with Turkey can be found in places 
where their interests converge. For example, in Central Asia, as an almost 
unique place where Western and Turkish interests are mostly aligned, 
the West should seek to encourage Turkish success and positive trends. 
However, despite a historical affinity and kinship with Turkic peoples in 
Central Asia, Turkey’s aspirations to become a more influential force will 
likely remain elusive as Turkey neither has military heft, economic capacities 
nor strategic vision to compete with Russian or Chinese engagement in the 
region. In the Balkans, although to some extent comparable pattern, the 
environment is much more complicated. Chances for collaboration can 
open in Ukraine where Turkey could play the role in facilitating dialogue 
to defuse the conflict (Al Monitor, 2021h). That is especially significant after 
Turkey with unprecedented controversy over its commitment to the 1936 
Montreux Convention14 portended a favorable posture toward the West. The 
list can be concluded with Afghanistan, where Turkey is trying to become 
an unavoidable party in the solution (The Diplomat, 2021), which should be 
acceptable for weary Western powers engaged in the protracted war.
3) Thus, even if the number of pessimists regard the engagement as the 
least likely scenario of three proposed policy responses, proponents of that 
option didn’t completely lose their voice. Stressing a high degree in overall 
integration between Europe and Turkey and assuming that Turkey is still 
14  The convention gives Turkey full control of the straits while imposing strict limitations 
for the military ships of non-littoral states, effectively restricting the access of US and NATO 
naval forces to the Black Sea. Besides Turkey plan to build an artificial waterway — Canal 
Istanbul — as an alternative to the Bosporus, raising questions as to whether Ankara is still 
committed to its balancing act. Turkey’s posture in the Ukraine-Russia tensions can put to a 
serious test the main geopolitical parameters that it has thus far observed in the Black Sea.
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mostly in line with Western interests, the analysis ultimately concludes that 
they require a more nuanced and supple style of relationship management, 
introducing a broader range of shared interests (Sloat, 2018). Keeping away 
Turkey from Russia is a strong impetus for this approach (Tocci, 2020).
After identifying trends in relations with Turkey, RAND Corporation in its 
research for the US government has systematically classified Turkish respective 
positioning in four broad categories: Difficult ally, Resurgent democracy, 
Strategic balancer, Eurasian power. Any of them, except the second one, will 
lead Turkish foreign and defense policies that are contrary, in varying degrees, 
to the interests of the US and other NATO allies warranting a considered 
reassessment of US and European strategy toward Turkey and preparations 
for disruptive developments in all aspects of relations (RAND, 2020).
The critical question is what direction the new US administration will take 
as in the Trump era personal relationships at leader levels squeezed out the 
policies preferred by the broader US administration, leaving Erdogan to 
largely acts with impunity. Unlike before, the first steps indicate that actions 
that will shape the US-Turkey relations under Joe Biden will tend to involve 
strategic decisions rather than mere changes of tone putting more pressure 
on Turkey15. Besides, expectation goes for a firmer position on Turkey’s 
reluctance in choosing sides whereas choosing a side is exactly what the 
West should demand of an ally. Former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, W. Robert 
Pearson in his commentary (Pearson, 2021), stated that “Turkey seems to seek 
the advantages while avoiding paying the price”, then asking “for how long 
Turkey can run with the hare and hunt with the hounds?”. The new US 
administration will likely not seek an early break with Turkey, but a firmer 
line is all but certain. In the meantime, according to one analysis (Hoffman, 
2021), the US should try to keep the relationship broadly frozen until 
something changes—either the economic crisis becomes so dire that Ankara 
is forced to make concessions, the next election brings political change, or 
Russia and Turkey fall out over one of the many issues that separate them.
15  The recognition of the 1915 mass killings of Armenian as genocide is an act that may 
upset an already tenuous relationship with Turkey but it is a risk president Biden appears 
willing to take to further human rights (The New York Times, 2021).
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Nor EAST…
Turkey sees Western actions too erratic and against its interests, while relations 
with Russia essentially adhere to stone-cold pragmatism and embrace cynical 
situational approaches (The Moscow Times, 2019) that ultimately serve to 
satisfy both countries. Be it in Syria, Libya or the Caucasus, the NATO and 
the EU have abdicated much of their responsibilities and shied away from 
risk, presenting a fertile ground for Russian rise on their behalf.
After tentative siding with Iran in Syria, Russia recognized a historical 
chance to drag Turkey in its orbit. The Astana framework, where Russia, 
Iran, and Turkey despite distinct visions have tried to reach compromise 
on development in the Syrian war, reinforced Russia’s upper hand in the 
dealings. Deepening energy and economic ties, close personal ties between 
presidents, bilateral diplomatic and military coordination in Syria, and 
Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 system, represent tangible manifestations 
of close relations where Russia holds the upper hand. Turkey is energy 
dependent on Russia, runs large trade deficits and the S-400 missile defense 
system only solidified the existing asymmetry in Turkish-Russian relations 
in the long run. Moreover, Russia is building the first nuclear plant in 
Turkey16 and has clear information dominance space with widely accepted 
Sputnik Turkish-language edition (RAND, 2018). With the rising number 
of Russian leverages, Turkey currently facilitates Russian positioning in the 
region by enabling Russia to thrive through its main foreign policy tools: 
energy, military, and arms sale.
Wary eyes of Western politicians are observing their rapprochement as 
Turkey and Russia through the series of conflicts have gained exclusive 
positions to arbiter in strategic parts of the world vital for Western interests 
and where neither of them has a genuine interest to achieve lasting peace. 
All conflicts have followed the same pattern. Despite their support for the 
opposing sides, they have tried to avoid direct clashes using proxies on 
the field and continuing with troubled status quo and ad hoc agreements. 




Even when directly confronted, sometimes with grave fatalities, they were 
ready for concessions. Most recently, in the fall of 2020, Turkey and Russia 
partnered in Nagorno Karabakh, where they followed the pattern of Syria 
and Libya they ultimately achieved to shut out Western powers (Isachenko, 
2020).
Although Russia is aware of the limits of their cooperation, it consistently 
presses Turkey (most frequently in Syria), which seeks to hedge its position, 
reinforcing its ties with the West. A possible point of friction could be some 
sort of escalation in Ukraine, where Turkey is more aligned with the West. 
Despite his dealings with Putin, Erdogan has repeatedly rejected Crimea’s 
annexation and forged active relations and military cooperation with 
Ukraine.
More frequent and frustrating altercations can push them toward an 
undesirable deterioration. Additionally, Erdogan’s erratic or miscalculated 
behavior should never be ruled out. As their relations are greatly influenced 
by overall Russian leverage on Turkey it is difficult to predict what their next 
move will be.
Conclusion
Some improvement in relations with Eastern countries, with the simultaneous 
weakening of the ties with the West, doesn’t imply a complete change. It 
seems now that Turkey, in its pursuit of a more independent role, equally 
values all big powers. In the foreseeable future, the West (the US, NATO, 
or the EU) should expect Turkey will most likely strive for a more assertive 
policy that repeatedly proves contrary to Western interests. It will remain an 
unpredictable ally and willingly pursue cooperation with its foes (Russia, 
China, or Iran) whenever it suits its shifting national interests.
The downturn in relations with the West and the US, in particular, runs 
deeper than any one of the current issues indicate. It is the consequence 
of Turkish changing view of the global balance of power as it believes 
that the relative influence of the West is waning in relation to its Eastern 
counterparts. The Middle East region and Turkish neighborhoods are not 
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exceptions. As distancing coincided with the consolidation of authoritarian 
power in Turkey, it only confirmed that the relations with the West will be 
more transactional. They will be based on the areas of mutual interest rather 
than on any shared value. The West cannot change it; it can only hope to 
manage the issues as they arise. Therefore, it is very important that Western 
politicians understand how Turkey makes its policy. Despite considerable 
friction, it is not willing to completely shift to the East but it is just that its 
current leadership rejects the established rules of the game. More Russian 
weapons or preference for financial arrangements with China instead of 
with the EU countries can be significant indicators of the future direction. 
One way or another, the US cannot count on Turkey’s support in the main 
objective of their current national security policy, namely, countering Russia 
or China. The Turkish-Russian concord is purely pragmatic and stems 
from their alienation from the West. Therefore, the future course of their 
cooperation will be determined by their respective relationships with the 
West. Russia will continue to balance those interests and strive to keep 
Turkey in its camp. By doing so it will deepen the rift with NATO and retain 
its strong influence on Turkey.
The ruling party, despite controversies, economic quandaries and internal 
political losses still holds firmly domestic position but Turkey will remain 
deeply divided country where domestic political, security and economic 
situations will likely remain volatile for some time. If nothing changes, 
the alliance with the MHP will continue to create difficulties for Erdogan 
in foreign policy, making Turkey more belligerent and intransigent for the 
West. Without new foundations more headaches are ahead, however, with 
all its setbacks, the West facilitated Turkey’s political and economic rise, and 
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